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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how State aid affects and distorts competition and trade within 
and across jurisdictions. We identify the circumstances in which state aid is likely to 
involve the largest distortions. In the context of the paper distortion of competition" is 
interpreted as the effect on rivals’ profits. We consider three types of state 
intervention, namely subsidies which affect marginal cost, entry and quality and 
analyse whether particular market characteristics are robust indicators of the 
magnitude of the distortions. We obtain the following results: (i) it appears that 
concentration is a fairly robust indicator; (ii) A high degree of substitution across 
differentiated products is not a robust indicator of the magnitude of the distortions. Its 
effect depends on the type of state intervention; (iii) The substitution among domestic 
products may have opposite effects respectively on domestic and foreign …rms. In 
particular, when the market is not concentrated and state aid takes the form of a 
production subsidy, a stronger substitution among domestic products will reduce the 
distortions felt by the foreign firm (but increase that felt by domestic rivals); Finally, 
(iv) the paper demonstrates that the impact of selective State aid on market prices and 
competitors can depend on the particular characteristics of the market. 
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In June of this year, the EU Commission launched an action plan seeking to
achieve less and better targeted aid in the next …ve years. One of the key
features of this action plan is a new emphasis on the role of economic analysis
in state aid control. In particular, theaction plan suggeststhattheevaluation of
state aids project involves the evaluation of a trade-o¤ between the correction of
marketfailuresand thedistortionsofcompetiton thatthey imply. Theobjective
of this paper is to contribute to the analysis of the distortions of competition
induced by state aids.
According to the EU’s approach, state aids distorts competition to the ex-
tent that it favours some undertakings (Commission Report, 2003a). In the
absence of a more explicit de…nition by the Commission, the question arises
how to interpret and operationalize this approach, which seems to focuse on
the extent to which state aids shifts rents in favour of some …rms and away
from others. Presumably this approach can be rationalised in terms of a wish
to expose all …rms to the same market discipline. Accordingly, it may ex-
press a concern that, to the extent that state aids allocates rents, it may induce
wasteful rent seeking or reduce …rms’ incentive to compete and improve e¢-
ciency. In what follows, we will adopt this approach and assume that in trying
to avoid distortions of “competition”, the Commission is really concerned about
the rents accruing to the …rms which do not receive the assistance. It is worth
emphasizing however that, whatever its rationale, the Commission’s approach is
likely to prohibit state aid which would increase welfare. State aid which shift
opportunities across …rms and reduce the pro…ts of competitors can nonetheless
increase welfare, in particular because they enhance consumer surplus.
Tracing out the e¤ect of state aid on competition (and competitors) requires
both a theory of the …rm to analyze how state aid will a¤ect the recipient’s
decisions and a theory of competitive interactions to understand how changes
in the strategy of the recipient(s) a¤ects the outcome of competition. Regarding
the recipient’s decision making, we adopt a neo-classical view of the the …rm
and focus on the e¤ect of state aids on its cost conditions as useful starting
point 1. This approach however abstracts from important considerations like
the internal governance structure and the …nancial structure of the …rm. In
particular, weconsider stateaidswhich reduce themarginalcostof the recipient
and state aid which a¤ects costs that are …xed but not sunk (like subsidies to
…nance generic capital equipment or subsidized leasing rates for such capital)
which a¤ect the pro…tability of entry and exit decisions (or more generally the
pro…tability of capacity expansions or reductions). We also consider the e¤ect
of state aids which a¤ects the cost of increasing product quality. Regarding the
competitive interactions, we focus on a workhorse model of price competition
with product di¤erentiation (à la Bowman).
The e¤ect that a change in the cost condition of one …rm can have on the
rents of others has not been subject to much speci…c attention so far. Besley
1See Harbord and Yarrow (1999) for a detailed discussion.
2and Seabright (1999) o¤er the conjecture that aid to …rms that do not have
signi…cant market power is not likely to lead to rent-shifting on an important
scale2. Furthermore, the authors note that this market power need not be
con…ned to output markets: “a …rm with little market power in output markets
but with substantial marketpower in markets for a specialized input (say skilled
labour) could still use state aid to gain rents in this way (e.g. by poaching
research scientists from other countries)”. Some insight can also be gained from
the literature on cost pass through. The conclusion reached by Stenneck and
Verboven, (2001) who survey the literature on this issue would imply that the
equilibrium is more likely to re‡ect the subsidy the larger is the proportion of
output accounted for by the recipient but that recipients with a large market
share may enjoy market power and may have an incentive to pass on their
cost reduction incompletely. As a result, they predict that the pass-through
of a subsidy on equilibrium prices is likely to be largest for recipients with an
intermediate market share. However, these authors do not focus either on the
e¤ect of a change in cost on competitors’ pro…t.
Thee¤ectthat state aid may haveon productdesign hasnotbeen extensively
considered. One exception is Mollgaard (2004) who analyses a model with
endogenous sunk cost and vertical di¤erentiation, in which …rms decide on their
investment in productimprovement in the …rststageand compete in price at the
second stage. In thisframework, areduction in the cost of product improvement
(for instance through a reduction in the cost of capital) will induce recipient to
investmore, sothat theywillsubsequently competewith higherqualityproducts
(which reduces the pro…ts of their competitors).
The …rst section outlines the model. Section 2 derives the e¤ect of subsidies
which a¤ect marginal cost. Section 3 focuses on subsidies which a¤ect …xed
costs and hence the number of …rms and section 4 considers state aid which
a¤ect …rms’ investment decisions in product quality.
1.1 A benchmark model
Given that EU policy is in principle concerned about distortions which occur
across countries, we consider a model with several geographic markets. Since
the objective is to trace out the e¤ect of state aid, we also want to specify a
model which is su¢ciently rich in terms of parameters so that a broad range of
potential e¤ects can be analyzed. The model that we outline will, in particular
allow for variations in (i) the magnitude of the …xed cost of entry (which will
determine the number of …rms in equilibrium), (ii) the degree of horizontal
product di¤erentiation between domestic products, (iii) vertical di¤erentiation
among domestic products, (iv) the degree of substitution between domestic and
foreign products and (v) the magnitude of trade costs.
Assume that there are twocountries, a home country labelled as country one
and a foreign country labelled as country two. Let us also consider an oligopolis-
tic industry in country 1, with n …rms, each of which produces a symmetrically
2Sleuwagen and Pennings, (2001a) and Besley and Seabright (1999) discuss the use of
market share as criteria for identifying important distortions of competition.
3di¤erentiated product. Country 2 has a single imperfectly competitive …rm pro-
ducing also a di¤erentiated good. For completeness, there is also a perfectly
competitive industry in both countries producing a homogeneous good using
constant returns to scale technology. This good is traded freely between the
two countries and acts as the numeraire good.
Under multilateral free trade, then+1…rmscompete in aBertrand oligopoly
in both home and the foreign markets. We assume that markets are interna-
tionally segmented, so …rms may choose prices in each national market sepa-
rately. For simplicity, we assume that the home …rms have constant marginal
cost c whereas the foreign …rm has constant marginal cost e c: In addition, home
…rm i sets price pi1 in the home market and pi2 in the foreign market. The
home …rm i sells output qi1 in the home market and qi2 in the foreign market,
where i = 1;:::;n. Furthermore, the foreign …rm sets price e p2 in the foreign
country and price e p1 in country 1. The foreign …rm sells output e q2 in its home
market and sells output e q1 in the country 1. Consumption of the home (foreign)
…rm’s di¤erentiated product in the home (foreign) market is equal to the sales
of the home (foreign) …rm in the home (foreign) market, qi1 (e q2); consumption
of the foreign (home) …rm’s di¤erentiated product in the home (foreign) market
is equal to the sales of the foreign (home) …rm in the home (foreign) market,
e q1 (qi2); and consumption of the numeraire good in each country is z. It is
assumed that there is a representative consumer in each country k with quasi-
linear preferences that can be represented by a quadratic utility function, as in
Vives (1985):
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ﬂikﬂjk < 1; for i 6= j; i = 1;:::;n;k =





< 1; for i = 1;:::;n; k = 1;2: It is assumed that ﬁik > c
and e ﬁk > c2 otherwise the ith …rm will not produce any output even if it has a
monopoly.
Note that ﬁik and e ﬁk are the demand intercepts and if di¤erent from ﬁjk,
is a measure of vertical product di¤erentiation. If ﬁik > ﬁjk; then …rm i is per-
ceived as providing a better quality than …rm j. On the other hand, therelation
between parameters ￿k and ﬂik, measures the degree of horizontal product dif-
ferentiation, i.e. customer preferences for agiven brand independently of quality




ﬂikﬂlk;i 6= l; i = 1;:::;n; k = 1;2; is a measure of the
degree of product substitutability among products i and l supplied by home
…rms in the country k ranging from zero when products are independent to one





; i = 1;:::;n; k = 1;2; is a measure of the degree of product substitutabil-
ity among products j supplied by a local …rm and the product supplied by the
foreign …rm in the country k ranging from zero when products are independent
to one when the products are perfect substitutes. For simplicity we will also
assume that 1 = ﬂik = ﬂlk = e ﬂk; i 6= l; i = 1;:::;n; k = 1;2:
Thegoods are substitutes, independentof complementsaccordingtowhether
￿i R 0; and ￿0
i R 0. Demand for good ij is always downward sloping in its own
price and increases (decreases) with increases in the price of the competitor if
the goods are substitutes (complements). It is straightforward to show that the
utility function (1) yields the following inverse demand functions for the home
…rms in country k




ke qk; i = 1;:::;n; k = 1;2; (2)
and the foreign …rms in the country k





qik; k = 1;2: (3)
The inverse demand functions can be more conveniently written as:
pik = ﬁik ¡(1¡￿k)qik ¡￿kQk ¡￿0
ke qk; i = 1;:::;n; k = 1;2; and (4)




e qk ¡ ￿
0
kQk; ; k = 1;2: (5)
where Qk =
Pn1
i=1qlk is the total output of the home …rms in the country k:
1.2 Subsidies which a¤ect marginal cost
This section assumes that the state can award a subsidy which reduces the mar-
ginal cost of some …rm(s). We consider the e¤ect of this subsidy by assuming
that there is no vertical di¤erentiation across products, and analyze how the
degree of substitution across products (within and across countries) and the
number of …rms a¤ect the magnitude of the distortions that such state inter-
vention induces3. In a model with no di¤erences in vertical di¤erentiation
equation (2) and equation (3) can then be rewritten as:




ke qk; i = 1;:::;n; k = 1;2; and (6)





qik; k = 1;2: (7)
3In appendix C, weshow that assuming di¤erent degrees of vertical di¤erentiation across
products does not a¤ect the results.
5Letusde…nethefollowingparameters Rk = (1¡￿k)
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Rk : We can now derive the
direct demand functions in country k as follows:
qik = ak ¡ bkpik +xk
n X
l6=i
plk +dke pk; i = 1;:::;n; k = 1;2; (8)
and direct demand function for the foreign …rm in country k as





ke pk; k = 1;2: (9)
With segmented marketsand constantmarginal costs, theBertrandoligopoly
in the home market can be analyzed independently of the foreign market so the
analysis will focus on the home market. Hereafter and for simplicity in the pre-
sentation we avoid the use of the subindex k = 1: Since the utility function is
quadratic, these functions are linear in prices.
1.2.1 Base Case Scenario with no subsidies
We …rst present the equilibrium outputs of the market in a benchmark scenario
in which no …rm receives any kind of subsidies (state aid) from their national
government. Following subsections will introduce alternative scenarios in which
stateaid are introduced by local authoritiesin ordertotracetheanticompetitive
e¤ect of this di¤erential treatment.
The pro…tfunctions of thehome…rms and the foreign …rm, respectively from
sales in the home country market are written:
¦i = (pi ¡ c)qi ¡ F; i = 1;:::;n, (10)
and
e ¦ = (e p¡e c ¡ t)e q ¡ e F; (11)
where t represents the transportation costs per production unit and F and e F
denotes a measure of …xed costs of production in the home and foreign country
respectively.
Wewillthen solvefor theBertrand equilibrium and forthe numberof …rmsat
the free entry equilibrium as function of the …xed cost of entry (in the domestic
market). All domestic …rms are symmetric and we focus on the symmetric
equilibrium where all domestic …rms charge the same price. The system of best
response curves then reduces to a couple of equations, which jointly determine
the price of domestic …rms, p¤
i and foreign …rm, e p¤: For general values of the
product di¤erentiation parameters, the equation of the home …rms and foreign










l + de p+bc
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i + b0e c+ b0t
!
: (13)
Solving this system for the equilibrium prices p¤









f2a0b ¡ (n ¡ 1)a0x+ nda +ndbc +[b0 (2b ¡ (n ¡ 1)x)](e c + t)g; (15)
where W = 2b0[2b ¡(n¡ 1)x] ¡nd2:



























Hence, it appears that the equilibrium price for the home producers, p¤
i; is
an increasing function of its own marginal cost, c: The price of foreign …rms
also increases with the cost of the domestic …rm but by less. As one would
expect, an increase in the marginal cost of domestic …rms reduces their pro…ts
but increases the pro…t of the foreign …rm. The intuition is as follows, an
increase in the marginal cost, c, forces equilibrium prices up. Since the increase






W [b02b] < 1), the margin of domestic …rms falls. Since the
price of the foreign …rm increases by less, the sale of domestic …rms must also
fall, and hence their pro…t falls. At the opposite, the margin of the foreign
…rm increases and their sales fall less than proportionally so that their pro…t
increases.
In a similar way, the price set by the foreign producer in equilibrium is an
increasingfunction of its own marginal cost, e c : The increase in homeproducers’
price as a consequence of an increase in the marginal cost of the foreign …rms
lower than the increase in the foreign price. The pro…t of domestic …rms
increases and that of the foreign …rm falls. Of course, the e¤ect of an increase
in transportation costs is the same at the e¤ect of a change in the cost of the
























With respect to the degree of product di¤erentiation and the number of











0 < 0 and
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Hence, as intuition would suggest, the greater the degree of product di¤er-
entiation among local producers (the lower is ￿), the greater the equilibrium
price-cost margin of the local producers. What may more surprising however
is that the price charged by the foreign …rm falls as the degree of product di¤er-
entiation among domestic …rms (a lower ￿) increases. This arises because the
foreign product becomes, in relative term, a closer substitute to local products.
Furthermore, thegreaterthe degreeof product di¤erentiation between local and
foreign producer (the lower is ￿0), the larger the equilibrium price-cost margin
for all the players in the market. Finally, the equilibrium price-cost margins
fall as the number of home …rms rises.
To illustrate these e¤ects, Table 1 and Table 2 below present some simula-
tions for a scenario with three home …rms and the following parameter values
ﬁ = 100; n = 3; c = e c = 5; F = e F = 25 and t = 2. One observes in partic-
ular that the price and pro…t of domestic and foreign …rms change in opposite
directions as the degree of local product di¤erentiation changes.
Table 1: Alternative scenarios in terms of local product
di¤erentiation, ￿ (￿0 = 0:7)
￿ = 0:8 ￿ = 0:7 ￿ = 0:65 ￿ = 0:6
p¤
i 12:39 15:78 17:37 18:86
e p¤ 18:12 16:65 15:78 14:77
¦¤
i 173:09 275:00 327:80 382:85
e ¦¤ 259:44 215:55 188:46 157:12
Table 2: Alternative scenarios in terms of foreign product
di¤erentiation, ￿
0 (￿ = 0:7)
￿0 = 0:8 ￿0 = 0:7 ￿0 = 0:65 ￿0 = 0:6
p¤
i 14:90 15:78 16:07 16:31
e p¤ 10:95 16:65 19:40 22:12
¦¤
i 260:86 275:00 283:28 291:75
e ¦¤ 53:01 215:55 300:99 390:52
Before analyzing the e¤ect of state aid in this context, it is important to
note that the change in prices induced by a change in cost or a change in the
degree of product di¤erentiation ( ￿0 and ￿) provide a reliable guide to the ef-
fect of pro…ts. This was shown earlier for a change in cost and is con…rmed
in the tables above for a change in product di¤erentiation. This arises be-
cause, in the context of this model, products are strategic complements. As
8a consequence, the distortion of competition which is induced by a change in
marginal cost (in terms of pro…t) can alsobe proxied by the changein price that
it induces. In what follows, we analyze how the magnitude of the distortion is
a¤ected by particular parameters. These e¤ects involve second derivatives of
equilibrium prices and pro…ts, and it is not clear that these second order e¤ects
will be necessarily the same for price and pro…ts. It is very di¢cult to obtain
analytical results for pro…ts and in what follows, we will thus focus on price
distortions. We develop some simulations in appendix A which con…rm that
important second order e¤ects (in particular those involving concentration and
the degree of substitution between …rms) go in the same direction for prices and
pro…ts. These simulation provide some con…dence that price distortions are
a good proxy for pro…t distortions, even with respect to second order e¤ects.
This limitation should however be kept in mind.
Let us now turn to the e¤ect of state aid which reduces the marginal cost of
one domestic …rm.
1.2.2 The e¤ect of subsidies
State aid is modelled as a production subsidy that has the e¤ect of reducing
the recipient …rm’s marginal cost of production. Speci…cally, let us assume that
the home state decides to grant a production subsidy, s1; to …rm 1 in the home
country: Thepro…t functions of thehome…rmsand theforeign …rm, respectively
from sales in the home country market are the written:
¦1 = (p1 ¡ c +s1)q1 ¡ F; (20)
¦i = (pi ¡c)qi ¡F; i = 2;:::;n (21)
and
e ¦ = (e p¡e c ¡ t)e q ¡ e F: (22)
All domestic …rms but …rm 1 are now symmetric. The system of best re-
sponse curves then involves three equations, which jointly determine the price
of domestic …rms, p¤¤
1 and p¤¤
i and the price of the foreign …rm, e p¤¤: For general
values of the product di¤erentiation parameters, the equation of the home …rms
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i +b(0e c + t)
!
: (25)
9Solving this system for the equilibrium prices p¤¤
1 ; p¤¤














f2a0b¡ (n¡ 1)a0x+ nda +ndbc ¡ ￿00s1 +[b0(2b ¡ (n ¡1)x)](e c +t)g;
(28)
where ￿ = 1
(2b+x)
¡




















￿0s1 < 0; i = 2;:::;n; and (30)
e p¤¤ ¡ e p¤ = ¡
1
W









@s1 < 0; and @e p
¤¤
@s1 < 0:
Hence, when a subsidy is granted to a home …rm, so that its marginal cost
decreases, itspricedecreases. Thepriceof domesticrivals and that of theforeign
…rm also decrease but by less. It is easy to check that the derivative of the
equilibrium price for …rm 1;p¤¤
1 ; with respect to the subsidy, s1; is, in absolute






¯ ¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯¡ 1
W ￿
¯ ¯ < 1). It means that the decrease
in the equilibrium price induced by the subsidy is always lower than magnitude
of the subsidy itself (less than complete pass-through). Domestic as well
as foreign competitors increase their own price, but by less. As noted above,
pro…ts are a¤ected in the same way as prices, so that the pro…t of the domestic













Let us now evaluate the magnitude of the distortion induced by the subsidy,
in terms of the degree of product di¤erentiation and the number of …rms. In
general, the e¤ect of the subsidy is not a monotonic function of the relevant












0 ? 0: (33)
The decrease in the price of the …rm enjoying the subsidy is not a monotonic
function neither of the number of …rms in the domestic products, n; nor of
the degree of substitution between home products, ￿, and home and foreign
10products, ￿
0: Some natural restriction on parameter values can however be con-
sidered. In particular, it is natural to assume, in the context of this model,
that the degree of product di¤erentiation between local and foreign products
exceeds the degree of product di¤erentiation among local products. We …rst
focus on the recipient.
E¤ect on the recipient With the restriction that degree of product di¤er-
entiation between local and foreign …rms exceeds that among local …rms, we
obtain that:





Hence, the pass-through by the recipient …rm is greater, the larger is the sub-
stitution among domestic products. In addition, the larger is the number of







The e¤ect of the substitution between domestic and foreign product is more
intricate. When the number of …rms is large, the pass-through of the recipient






@s1@￿0 > 0). When there are only few domestic competitors, an
additional condition needs to be satis…ed, such that the substitution between
domestic products is large enough (￿ is large enough, with ￿ larger than ￿0)4:
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate, showing the range of parameters (the shaded area)
for which the pass-through falls with an increase in the substitution between
domestic and foreign products.


















4Alternatively, if ￿0 is larger than ￿; then (￿0 ¡ ￿) needs to be large enough.
11Figure 2: Range of ￿ and ￿


















Considering the e¤ect of an increase in the number of …rms, we observe that





@s1@n > 0), at
least if the degree of substitution between domestic and foreign products and
across domestic products is high enough. When substitution is low, there is a
threshold number of …rms such that for highly concentrated market, the pass-





@s1@n < 0) up
to the threshold and subsequently falls. In other words, the pass-through
will then to low when rivalry5 is limited and the market is concentrated and
when the market is atomistic. If rivalry is low, a fall in concentration will
initially increase the pass-through up to a point and subsequently fall. This
arises because in highly concentrated market, the recipient will not pass on the
bene…t of the subsidy to consumers, at least if rivalry does not induce them to
do so. As concentration increases, competition is enhanced and the recipient
will pass on a greater proportion of the subsidy. However, as concentration
falls further, the recipient …rms becomes small relative to the markets and pass-
through is less. By contrast if rivalry is intense enough, the recipient will
pass on large proportion of the subsidy even if concentration is high. And the
pass-through will decrease monotonically as the number of …rms increases.
Let’s now analyze the e¤ect of the subsidy received by …rm 1 on the equi-
librium prices of rival …rms in the market.
E¤ect on rivals We …rst consider domestic rivals. The extent of the dis-












@s1@￿0 7 0; i = 2;:::;n;
5In what follows, a high value of ￿ is interpreted as involving either a low degree of product
di¤erentiation, a high degree of substitution across products or a high degree of rivalry.
12Hence, the distortion (proxied by the decrease in the price for a local …rm)
induced by the subsidy received by the rival …rm 1 is larger, when the number
of domestic …rms is smaller and the degree of substitution across local products
is larger (product di¤erentiation among home products is smaller). In other
words, domestic competitors are more a¤ected in concentrated markets and in
markets where rivalry is greater. Intuitively, concentration matters because
with a small number of …rms, the recipients accounts for a relatively large share
of output and hence has more of an e¤ect on competitors. Rivalry matters
because competitors are induced to respond more sharply to the price reduction
of the recipient.
The e¤ect of the substitution between domestic and foreign products is how-
ever often the opposite of the substitution across domestic products. Assuming
as before that substitution across domestic products is greater than substitution
between domestic and foreign products ( ￿ > ￿
0 ) one observes that the distor-
tion in the price for the local …rms as a consequence of the subsidy received by
the rival …rm 1 is always larger, when the degree of substitution between home





@s1@￿0 > 0). That is,







Hence, a lower rivalry with the foreign product will actually increase the
distortion. In other words, more segmented markets willlead agreaterdomestic
distortion. The intuition behind this result can be described as follows; when
the foreign product operates in a niche, much of the burden of the adjustment
to the more aggressive pricing of the recipient is supported by domestic …rms.
When it becomes more like domestic products, the burden of the adjustment
will be shared more evenly.
This result can also be reinterpreted in terms of the e¤ect that asymmetry
has on the distortion of competition. An increase in the degree of substitution
between domestic and foreign will tend to induce a more symmetric pattern of
prices and market shares. It would appear that, for a given number of …rms,
symmetry will reduce the distortions imposed on …rms that are alike.









0 7 0: (34)
Hence, the distortion imposed on the foreign …rm as a consequence of the
subsidy received by the rival …rm 1is larger, when the number of domestic …rms
is smaller. This e¤ect is the same as that found for domestic rivalry. Further-
more, if ￿ > ￿0 the distortion imposed on the foreign …rm as a consequence of
the subsidy received by the rival …rm 1 is always larger, when the degree of
substitution across foreign and domestic products is larger (￿0 is larger). That
is
If ￿ > ￿0 )
@2e p¤¤
@s1@￿0 < 0:
13In other words, foreign rivals will be less a¤ected in segmented markets. As one
would expect, as the foreign product becomes a closer substitute to domestic
alternatives, itwillmorea¤ected by a subsidy granted to adomesticrival. That
is also to say that an increasein symmetry across …rms will alsotend toincrease
the distortion imposed on the …rm that is unlike its competitors.
The e¤ect of the substitution across domestic products is more intricate.
The distortion is not a monotonic function of the degree of substitution across






@s1@￿ remains always positive, that is, the distortion in the price of the
foreign …rm is larger, when the degree of product di¤erentiation across local
products increases (￿ is lower).
If ￿ > ￿




This e¤ect is the opposite of that found for domestic rivals. It can be explained
as follows: an increase in the degree of product di¤erentiation among domestic
…rms will actually make foreign and domestic …rms more alike (as ￿ falls, it
becomes closer to ￿0) . Hence, the foreign …rm will be more a¤ected by the
subsidy granted to a domestic rival. However, there is a second e¤ect at work.
An increasein the degreeof productdi¤erentiation will reduce the rivalry among
domestic …rms. Their prices will fall by less in response to a subsidy and as
a result, the foreign …rm will also be less a¤ected. This second e¤ect will
be particularly strong when the number of domestic …rms is small and it may
actually dominate the …rst e¤ect so that the distortion imposed on the foreign




@s1@￿ < 0) if concentration is high enough6.
State aid a¤ecting marginal cost : summary A number of conclusions
emerge. First, an increase in concentration (associated with a reduced number
of …rms) will always increase the distortion incurred by all competitors, both
domestic and foreign. This arises mostly because a reduction in the number of
…rms increases the proportion of output which is subsidized.
Second, a more intense rivalry among domestic …rms (associated with less
product di¤erentiation), will increase the distortion on both domestic and for-
eign …rms when concentration is high enough. When concentration is low, a
more intense rivalry will still increase the distortion on domestic …rms but will
reduce the distortion on foreign …rms.
6For instance, it can be shown that:
If n = 2, then
@ 2e p¤¤
@s1@￿




If n = 3, then
@ 2e p¤¤
@s1@￿





14Third, more segmented markets will have opposite e¤ects on domestic and
foreign …rms. The distortion on domestic …rms will increase and that imposed
on foreign …rms will decrease.
Fourth, a reduction in the asymmetry across …rms (for a given number) will
reallocate the distortion more evenly. It is not clear whether a more symmetric
pattern (for instance, a lower Her…ndahl index) a¤ects the overall magnitude of
the distortion.
Hence, it would appear that concentration and the degree of segmentation
across markets are unambiguously related to the magnitude of the distortions
induced by state aid. Domestic rivalry is also reliable indicator of the distor-
tion imposed on domestic…rmsbut, interestingly, theimportance of thespillover
across countries is a¤ected by concentration in the domestic industry. Indus-
tries which feature both a high degree of rivalry and high concentration will
involve higher spillovers to foreign …rms.
1.3 Subsidies which a¤ect entry
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of a subsidy which prevents exits or induces
entry. Hence, we seek to identify the circumstances in which the prices and
pro…ts of existing competitors are particularly a¤ected by the presence of a
subsidized …rm (which would otherwise be absent from the industry). We use
the same underlying model as that presented in the previous section (in which
there is no vertical di¤erentiation across products). As one would expect,
the extent to which competitors’ prices are a¤ected depends on the degree of
product di¤erentiation among local …rms (￿) and among local and foreign …rms
(￿0). However, the e¤ect on prices of a change in the number of …rms is not a
monotonic function of the degree of product di¤erentiation among the products
in the market. Analytical results are also di¢cult to derive. Some conclusions
can be still be obtained from simulations. The base parameter used for the
simulations are c = e c = 5; t = 2; ﬁ = 100 and s1 = 1. We report results for
the entire range of admissible values for ￿ and ￿
0:
1.3.1 E¤ects on domestic rivals
The distortion on local rivals which is induced by an additional competitor





@n@￿ > 0); at least if the degree of substitution among local …rms is large
enough (and ￿ > ￿0). In addition, the larger is the initial number of …rms in
the market the lower is the minimum level of ￿ necessary to ensure the direction
of this e¤ect. This can be interpreted as follows : in principle. one would
expect that when product di¤erentiation is strong (so that products operate in
niches), the e¤ect of an additional competitors will be felt more strongly as the
degree of product di¤erentiation increases. At the same time, when product
di¤erentiation is already very high, margins will be low and the reduction in
price induced by an additional …rm will hardly be a¤ected any longer by a
reduction in product di¤erentiation (for instance, when products are almost
15perfect substitutes). Hence, it is natural to expect that the e¤ect of entry will
…rst increase and then fall with the degree of substitution. This is what is
found here. In addition, we observe that the range of substitution parameter
for which the e¤ect of entry increase with substitution is smaller when there is a
large number of incumbent …rms. This arises because the rivalry has less of an
impact on margins when the number of …rms is large (in those circumstances,
margins are largely determined by the number of competitors). These e¤ects
are illustrated in Table 3 and …gures 3.1. to 3.3. below:





@n@￿ as a function of ￿;￿0 and n:
n = 2 n = 3 n = 10
￿ = ￿
0 = :8 ¡7:57 1:29 1:30
￿ = :8, ￿0 = :5 10:98 10:15 1:27
￿ = :8; ￿0 = :3 17:26 12:18 1:32
￿ = ￿0 = :5 ¡14:35 4:09 1:56
￿ = :5; ￿0 = :3 ¡13:63 ¡1:25 1:78
￿ = ￿0 = :2 ¡20:56 ¡13:60 ¡0:04






















































If ￿ > ￿0; the decrease on local rivals’ price as a consequence of an increase
in the number of …rms is larger when the degree of substitution among local





@n@￿0 > 0): See Table 4 and …gures 4.1. to 4.3.
below. This result can be interpreted as follows; as the substitution between
domestic and foreign products become closer to the substitution across domestic
products, a greater share of the adjustment associated with entry will be felt
by the foreign …rm. The distortion imposed on local …rms will then to be
less. Note however (see table 4 and …gures 4.1 to 4.3) that when the number
of domestic …rms is large, this e¤ect hardly matters. This arises simply because
the (sole) foreign …rm becomes relatively unimportant.





@n@￿0 as a function of ￿;￿0 and n:
￿ = :8; ￿
0= :8 ￿ = :8; ￿
0= :5 ￿ = :8; ￿
0= :3
n = 2 21:71 7:57 5:56
n = 3 7:31 1:76 1:50
n = 10 ¡0:01 0:04 :068
17￿ = :5; ￿0= :5 ￿ = :5; ￿0= :3 ￿ = :2; ￿0= :2
n = 2 14:27 9:71 6:27
n = 3 7:08 4:20 4:65
n = 10 :19 :20 :85






















































1.3.2 E¤ect on the foreign rival
If ￿ > ￿0; then the distortion imposed on the foreign …rm as a consequence of an





@n@￿ > 0). Hence, unlikewhathappenswith domestic
…rms, the e¤ect of entry falls monotonically with the degree of substitution
among domestic products. This arise presumably because the e¤ect of entry
on the foreign …rm is largely determined by the degree of substitution between
domestic and foreign …rm - which is by assumption less than the degree of
substitution across domestic products. Hence, when the degree of substitution
across domestic products is low (a parameter range for which the distortion on
domestic …rms increases with the substitution among domestic products), the
rivalry between domestic and foreign …rms is even less. See Table 5 and …gures
5.1. to 5.3. below:




@n@￿ as a function of ￿;￿
0 and n:
￿ = :8;￿0 = :8 ￿ = :8; ￿0 = :5 ￿ = :8, ￿0 = :3
n = 2 9:61 11:20 7:76
n = 3 7:70 7:50 4:87
n = 10 1:52 0:95 0:58
￿ = :5, ￿0 = :5 ￿ = :5; ￿0 = :3 ￿ = :2, ￿0 = :2
n = 2 8:16 4:73 4:90
n = 3 8:25 5:60 6:44
n = 10 2:98 1:87 6:38
Figure 5.1.: Values of ￿ and ￿’ such that @
2e p
¤¤






























Figure 5.3.: Values of ￿ and ￿’ such that @
2e p
¤¤













20If ￿ > ￿
0; the distortion imposed on the foreign price as a consequence of an
increase in the number of …rms is larger when the degree of substitution among
local and foreign products increases (i.e., @
2e p
¤¤
@n@￿0 < 0): This e¤ect is the mirror
image of the e¤ect discussed for domestic rivals. As the substitution between
domestic and foreign …rm increases, the foreign …rm becomes more similar to
the domestic …rms and accordingly is more a¤ected by the entry of a domestic
competitor. See Table 6 and …gures 6.1. to 6.3. below:
Table 6: Values of @
2e p
¤¤
@n@￿0 as a function of ￿;￿0 and n:
￿ = :8, ￿0 = :8 ￿ = :8, ￿0 = :5 ￿ = :8, ￿0 = :3
n = 2 4:59 ¡4:74 ¡6:55
n = 3 0:93 ¡2:48 ¡2:90
n = 10 ¡0:30 ¡0:26 ¡0:26
￿ = :5, ￿
0 = :5 ￿ = :5; ￿
0 = :3 ￿ = :2, ￿
0 = :2
n = 2 ¡8:14 ¡11:60 ¡19:10
n = 3 ¡5:20 ¡7:50 ¡15:33
n = 10 ¡1:22 ¡1:30 ¡5:66
Figure 6.1.: Values of ￿ and ￿’ such that @
2e p
¤¤















Figure 6.2.: Values of ￿ and ￿’ such that @
2e p
¤¤


































1.3.3 Subsidies which a¤ect entry - summary
The following results emerge. First, it appears the distortion induced by the
entry (or lack of exit) of a subsidized …rm is likely to be limited when there
is intense rivalry between domestic …rms. This holds both for domestic and
foreign …rms.
Second, the distortion induced by entry islikely to be most pronounced when
rivalry between domestic …rms is moderate and when concentration is relatively
high.
Third, areduction in concentration will reducethe importance of the distor-
tion, both because entry is less signi…cant at the margin with a higher number
of …rms but also because a reduction in concentration will enlarge the set of
substitution parameters for which the distortion will be relatively small. In
other words, there is a complementarity between rivalry and low concentration
to reduce the distortion.
22Fourth, increased marketsegmentation will increasethedistortion on domes-
tic …rms but reduce the distortion which is incurred by the foreign competitor.
1.4 State aid which a¤ects vertical di¤erentiation
This section studies subsidies that do not a¤ect the cost structure of the …rm
but the degree of vertical product di¤erentiation in the market. The state aid
is assumed to reduce the cost of raising quality for the recipient (for instance,
it may be a government intervention which reduces the cost of research and
development). As a result, the recipient will end up selling a product of higher
quality. Hence, we analyze in what circumstances rivals will be most a¤ected
by an increase in the quality sold by the recipient …rm.
For simplicity and tractability, we assume that there are two local …rms in
the market (n = 2) and one foreign …rm. In a model of vertical di¤erentiation,
inverse demand curves for the local and foreign …rm can then be written as:
p1 = ﬁ1 ¡ q1 ¡ ￿q2 ¡ ￿
0e q; (35)
p2 = ﬁ2 ¡q2 ¡ ￿q1 ¡ ￿
0e q; and (36)
e p = e ﬁ¡ e q ¡￿0(q1 + q2): (37)
If ﬁi > ﬁj; then …rm j is perceived as providing a better quality than …rm i.
We can now derive the direct demand functions as follows:
q1 = ¡b(p1 ¡ ﬁ1)+ x(p2 ¡ﬁ2)+d(e p¡ e ﬁ); (38)
q2 = ¡b(p2 ¡ ﬁ2)+ x(p1 ¡ﬁ1)+d(e p¡ e ﬁ); and (39)
e q = ¡b0(e p¡ e ﬁ)+ d
2 X
i=1
(pi ¡ ﬁi); (40)
where W = (1¡￿)
¡
1+￿ ¡ 2ﬂ2¢

























Letusassumethatmarginalcost of production forlocal…rmsisc; whereas marginal
cost of foreign …rm is e c: When the strategic variables are prices and there are no

































b0x ¡2b0b + 2d2¢
e ﬁ +db(ﬁ1 + ﬁ2)+ : (43)
(b0x¡ 2b0b)(e c+ t)¡ 2dbc):
where W0 = 2
¡
d2 ¡ 2b0b +b0x
¢
(2b+ x):








































That is, an increase in the quality of a rival will reduce the equilibrium price of
both local and foreign …rms. An increase in own quality will lead to a higher
price. In other words, the rivals of the recipient …rms will be induced to reduce
their prices by a state aid which reduces the cost of quality. It is important
to note however that the pro…ts of rivals will not necessarily fall. Unlike what
happens with subsidies with a¤ect marginal cost, the price of the recipient …rm
increases and that of the rivals fall. Hence, the link between the direction
of changes in prices and pro…ts that was observed for a subsidy to marginal
cost (such that they moved in the same direction) may no longer hold. The
increase in the price of the recipient may actually shift enough demand to the
rivals so that their pro…t will increase (despite the fact that their equilibrium
price falls). In what follows, we will …rst investigate the circumstances which
a¤ect the magnitude of this price distortion, given that it is di¢cult to derive
analytical results with respect to pro…ts. We subsequently undertake some
simulations to investigate the e¤ect of pro…ts.
1.4.1 E¤ect on rivals









0 > 0; (46)
To …x ideas, assume that …rm j is the recipient of the subsidy, such that its
quality increases. The e¤ect on the domestic rival is larger when the substi-
tution across domestic products is large. This arises as before because com-
petitors are induced to react more sharply when substitution is large. The
24distortion falls however when the degree of substitution between domestic and
foreign products is higher. In other words, more segmented market will lead to
a greater distortion.
Turning to the foreign …rm, there is no monotonic relation between the












2 ¡￿ + 2ﬂ
2 ¡2
¢2 (1¡2￿) ? 0; i = 1;2: (47)
From this equation, it appears that the distortion increases with the degree of
substitution among local …rms as long as the degree of substitution among local





Furthermore when ￿ > ￿
0(that is the degree of product substitution is lower
between foreign and local …rms than among local …rms), the distortion incurred
by the foreign product increases with the degree of substitution between domes-
tic and foreign products, i.e. :
@2e p~
@ﬁi@￿0 < 0: (48)









That is, the increase in price as a consequence of an increase in own product
quality is larger when the degree of product substitution among local product
is lower (￿ is lower), provided that the degree of product substitution is lower
between foreign and local …rms than among local …rms. However, there is no
a monotonic relation between the extent of the distortion and the the degree








. It can be shown
that when the degree of substitution in the local market is su¢ciently high
(high ￿ values), the increase in price motivated by the increase in quality is
an increasing function of the degree of substitution between local and foreign






1.4.2 Subsidies that a¤ect the degree of vertical product di¤erenti-
ation - summary
A number of results emerge. First, it appears that a high degree of rivalry
will increase the distortion on domestic rivals but also on foreign rivals, as long
as domestic rivalry is strong enough. Second, market segmentation will have
opposite e¤ects on domestic an foreign …rms. The distortion on domestic …rms
will increase and that imposed on foreign …rms will decrease.
In the context of the model presented here, the number of …rms has been
…xed. The e¤ect of concentration is investigated through a limited simulation
25presented in appendix B. The results presented in this appendix con…rm thatan
increase in concentration will tend to enhance the distortions on both domestic
and foreign …rms.
Overall, the circumstances in which price distortions induced by a subsidy
which a¤ects the quality of products are greatest appear to be similar to those
found above in the case of subsidies which a¤ect marginal cost. In particular,
concentration and the degree of rivalry among domestic …rms have the same
e¤ect of the distortions imposed on domestic …rms.
However, as mentioned above, the e¤ect of the subsidy on the price of rivals
may di¤er from its e¤ect on pro…ts. The simulations presented in Appendix
B suggest that pro…ts of rivals are more likely to increase when the degree of
substitution among domestic products is large (and concentration is high).
1.5 Factors which a¤ect the distortions of competition
We brie‡y collect the results that we have derived with respect to three types
of state intervention (marginal cost, entry and quality) and analyze whether
particular market characteristics are robust indicators of the magnitude of the
distortions. First, it appears that concentration is a fairly robust indicator. In
allthreecases, an increaseinconcentrationtendstoincreasethepricedistortions
that is incurred by domestic and foreign …rms. The presumption that state aid
is more likely to induce distortions in concentrated market thus receives some
support. On should however be cautions in the case of subsidies which a¤ect
quality; if high concentration induces large price distortions, it may however not
necessarily lead to a reduction in the pro…t of rivals.
Second, intense domestic rivalry (which could be proxied by low margins or
low product di¤erentiation) is not a robust indicator of the magnitude of the
distortions. Its e¤ect depend on the type of state intervention. When state
aid takes the form of reductions in marginal cost, it will be a good indicator
of the magnitude of the distortions, for domestic …rms. With respect to state
intervention which induces entry (or prevents exit), it is an intermediate degree
of rivalry which will induce the greatest distortions. Finally, with respect to
state intervention which a¤ects quality, rivalry will tend to increase the price
distortions but it will might also increase the likelihood that rivals will bene…t
in terms of pro…t. This would suggest that the degree of rivalry should be
considered carefully as an indicator of the magnitude of the distortion. Its
e¤ectwilldepend on the whether thesubsidy a¤ects marginalcostorthe quality
of the product sold by the recipient.
Third, domestic rivalry may have opposite e¤ects respectively on domestic
and foreign …rms. In particular, when the market is not concentrated and state
aid takes the form of a production subsidy, domestic rivalry will reduce the
distortions felt by the foreign …rm (but increase that felt by domestic rivals).
That is also to say that the importance of the spillover across countries is not
only a function of the extent of market segmentation but also a function of the
conditions of competition in the domestic market.
Fourth, the e¤ect of market segmentation is without surprise; in all three
26cases, a greater segmentation will insulate the foreign …rm from state interven-
tion and increase the distortion which is felt by domestic …rms.
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27A A numerical example - horizontal product dif-
ferentiation
This appendix provides a numerical example for the e¤ect of production subsi-
dies with horizontal product di¤erentiation. Table 7 and Table 8 below present
some simulations in terms of equilibrium prices and pro…ts for two alternative
scenarios with two and three home …rms in the local market and the following
parameter values ﬁ = 100; c = e c = 5; and t = 2. These simulations illustrate
the various e¤ects discussed in the text. They also con…rm that second order
e¤ects for pro…ts are the same as those developed in the text for prices. For
instance, comparing the …rst and second panels of table 7, one observes that the
pro…t distortion imposed on domestic (foreign)…rms increases (decreases) as the
substitution between domestic and foreign products increases. A comparison
between the second and third panel con…rms that the pro…t distortion imposed
on domestic rivals increases with the degree of substitution among domestic
…rms. The pro…t distortion imposed on the foreign …rm also increases, in line
with what is found in the text with respect to prices when concentration is high.
Finally, a comparison between tables 8 and 9 con…rms that the pro…t distortion
imposed on domestic and foreign …rms increases with concentration.
Table 8: Competitive e¤ects of state aid (n = 2)





e p¤¤ 20:90¡ :15s1
¦¤¤
1 387:50+ :547s1(53:25+ s1)¡ F
¦¤¤
i 387:50¡:121s1 (113:19¡s1)¡F
e ¦¤¤ 423:92¡0:050s1(183:74¡ s1)¡ e F





e p¤¤ 49:06¡ :02s1
¦¤¤
1 634:93+ :456s1 (74:63+ s1)¡ F
¦¤¤
i 634:93¡ :157s1 (127:16¡s1) ¡F
e ¦¤¤ 1789:1¡ 0:0005s1 (3636:80¡ s1)¡e F








1 1692:70+ :256s1(162:55+ s1)¡ F
¦¤¤
i 1692:70¡ 0:002s1(1624:6¡ s1)¡F
e ¦¤¤ 1788:0¡ 0:0005s1 (3625:6¡s1)¡e F
28Table 9: Competitive e¤ects of state aid (n = 3)





e p¤¤ 18:12¡ :11s1
¦¤¤
1 198:09+:689s1 (33:89+ s1)¡F
¦¤¤
i 198:09¡ :075s1(102:96¡ s1)¡F
e ¦¤¤ 284:44¡ :030s1(194:09¡ s1)¡e F











e ¦¤¤ 1746:00¡ :0003s1(4803:10¡s1)¡e F





e p¤¤ 47:20¡ :02s1
¦¤¤
1 1414:80+ :260s1(147:37+s1) ¡F
¦¤¤
i 1414:80¡:002s1(1601:60¡ s1)¡F
e ¦¤¤ 1651:90¡:0005s1(3761:70¡s1)¡e F
B A numerical example - vertical product dif-
ferentiation
This appendix develops a numerical example to illustrate the e¤ects of an in-
crease in the quality of a product (product 1). Let us assume that marginal
costs in the industry are such that c = e c = 5 and the level of transportation
costs is t = 2: Substituting these values into equation (41), equation (42) and
equation (43) we obtain the following results dependingon the degreeof vertical
and horizontal product di¤erentiation. It is worth noting in particular that the
pro…t of the domestic rival increases as a result of a higher quality, when there
are two …rms in the market and when substitution is high (see Table 11).
Table 10a: Bertrand Competition with
Vertical Product Di¤erentiation (n = 2)
￿ = 0:8 and ￿
0 = 0:7 ￿ = 0:8 and ￿
0 = 0:1
p~
1 4:64+ :42ﬁ1¡:20ﬁ2¡:11e ﬁ 4:22+ :40ﬁ1¡:24ﬁ2¡0:008e ﬁ
p~
2 4:64¡ :20ﬁ1+:42ﬁ2¡:11e ﬁ 4:22¡ :24ﬁ1+:40ﬁ2¡0:008e ﬁ
e p~ 5:30¡ :15ﬁ1¡:15ﬁ2+:46e ﬁ 3:73¡0:02ﬁ1¡0:02ﬁ2+:499e ﬁ





e p~ 3:74¡ 0:02ﬁ1¡0:02ﬁ2+:498e ﬁ
Table 10b: Bertrand Competition with Vertical Product
Di¤erentiation (n = 3)
￿ = 0:8 and ￿0= 0:7 ￿ = 0:8 and ￿0= 0:1
p~
1 4:76+:44ﬁ1¡:14(ﬁ2 + ﬁ3)¡0:07ﬁ4 4:53+ :43ﬁ1¡:16(ﬁ2 + ﬁ3)¡0:005ﬁ4
p~
2 4:76+:44ﬁ2¡:14(ﬁ1 + ﬁ3)¡0:07ﬁ4 4:53+ :43ﬁ2¡:16(ﬁ1 + ﬁ3)¡0:005ﬁ4
p~
3 4:76+:44ﬁ3¡:14(ﬁ1 + ﬁ2)¡0:07ﬁ4 4:53+ :43ﬁ3¡:16(ﬁ1 + ﬁ2)¡0:005ﬁ4








￿ = 0:2and ￿
0 = 0:1
3:13+ :49ﬁ1 ¡0:045(ﬁ2 + ﬁ3)¡:020ﬁ4
3:13+ :49ﬁ2 ¡0:045(ﬁ1 + ﬁ3)¡:020ﬁ4
3:13+ :49ﬁ3 ¡0:045(ﬁ1 + ﬁ2)¡:020ﬁ4
3:84¡ 0:02(ﬁ1 +ﬁ2 + ﬁ3)+ :497ﬁ4
Table 10a to Table 12b below simulate the changes in pro…ts for particular
values of the substitution parameters.
Table 11a: Equilibrium Pro…ts and Vertical Product Di¤erentiation
(n = 2, ￿ = 0:8 and ￿0 = 0:7)
ﬁ1 = ﬁ2 = e ﬁ = 100 ﬁ1 = 125 and ﬁ2 = e ﬁ = 100
¦¤
1 388¡ F 1457¡F
¦¤
2 388¡ F 1227¡F
e ¦¤ 424¡ e F 225¡ e F
Table 11b: Equilibrium Pro…ts and Vertical Product Di¤erentiation
(n = 3, ￿ = 0:8 and ￿0 = 0:7)
ﬁ1= ﬁ2=e ﬁ= 100 ﬁ1 = 125 and ﬁ2 = e ﬁ = 100
¦¤




3 198¡ F 52¡F
e ¦¤ 284¡e F 157¡e F
Table 12a: Equilibrium Pro…ts and Vertical Product Di¤erentiation
(n = 2; ￿ = 0:8 and ￿
0 = 0:1)
ﬁ1= ﬁ2=e ﬁ= 100 ﬁ1 = 125and ﬁ2 = e ﬁ = 100
¦¤
1 634:9¡ F 1770:7¡ F
¦¤
2 634:9¡ F 233:8¡F
e ¦¤ 1789:1¡e F 1740:2¡e F
Table 12b: Equilibrium Pro…ts and Vertical Product Di¤erentiation
(n = 3; ￿ = 0:8 and ￿
0 = 0:1)
30ﬁ1= ﬁ2=e ﬁ= 100 ﬁ1 = 125 and ﬁ2 = e ﬁ = 100
¦¤
1 285¡ F 1352¡ F
¦¤
2= ¦¤
3 285¡ F 86:7¡ F
e ¦¤ 1746¡e F 1710¡e F
Table 13a: Equilibrium Pro…ts and Vertical Product Di¤erentiation
(n = 2; ￿ = 0:2 and ￿0 = 0:1)
ﬁ1= ﬁ2=e ﬁ= 100 ﬁ1 = 125and ﬁ2 = e ﬁ = 100
¦¤
1 1693¡ F 2894¡ F
¦¤
2 1693¡ F 1590¡ F
e ¦¤ 1788¡ e F 1739¡e F
Table 13b: Equilibrium Pro…ts and Vertical Product Di¤erentiation
(n = 3; ￿ = 0:2 and ￿
0 = 0:1)
ﬁ1= ﬁ2=e ﬁ= 100 ﬁ1 = 125and ﬁ2 = e ﬁ = 100
¦¤
1 1415¡ F 2538¡ F
¦¤
2 1415¡ F 1328¡ F
e ¦¤ 1652¡ e F 1608¡e F
C The e¤ect of a production subsidy with ver-
tical product di¤erentiation
In this appendix, we show that the e¤ect of production subsidies on prices is
una¤ected by the degree of vertical di¤erentiation.
Using the model of section 4.4 (Bertrand competition with both vertical and
horizontal product di¤erentiation), it is easy to prove that when we introduce
a state aid that reduces the marginal cost of …rm 1; the decline on rival’s equi-








= 0; 8i;j = 1;:::;n: (50)
This result may be due to the linearity of the demand speci…cation that we
use.
31